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degrees of self-determination. Throughout the universe of concrete reality, this latter everywhere exists and operates in some degree; if but slightly, then determination is mainly from without, and "necessity" reigns; but as the level of internal self-determination rises, it becomes gradually transformed into "freedom"; and just as the mind is nowhere wholly free, so the body and the material universe as a whole are never completely dominated by necessity. To say therefore with Dr. Carr that one is rigidly determined and the other free, is to abandon that antithesis between them which is from the outset indispensable to his whole argument.

J. E. TURNER.

LIVERPOOL, ENG.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

An Introduction to Philosophy. HOLLY ESTIL CUNNINGHAM.
Boston: Richard G. Badger. 1920. Pp. 257.

Time was—perhaps still is—when an introduction to philosophy consisted in casting the young, unsuspecting mind overboard from the craft of everyday thought into the vast and vague deep of fundamental questions, and bidding it strike out and swim or sink—below the college passing mark. Professor Cunningham's "introduction" is in strong contrast with this Jonah-like process. With remarkable deliberation for so small a volume, in chapter after chapter, he points out to the student the contours of the solid shoreline of science and common fact, and how they reach down in slope after slope to the sea of philosophy. Then he leads his charge a little way into the water, showing him that the same earth is still underfoot, but adding that the water is much deeper beyond—in places unplumbed. This course commends itself as more merciful to the bewildered and perhaps shivery novice; but is it an introduction to philosophy? Can one get a real acquaintance with metaphysics or ethics—more than a bowing one—without actually grappling with their problems? Is wading a mean proportional between land travel and swimming?

The author begins with a plea for the genetic method. This appears to be sound logically; but has he recognized the pedagogic limitations of that method? A study of origins can be very dull and pointless to those who have not yet acquired an interest in the subject matter.

In the next five chapters a survey is made of what are called the psychological, physiological and social "backgrounds to philosophy," which prove to be substantially the fields of social psychology and anthropology. This course the author justifies on the ground that

"philosophy is one type of action, one method of meeting problems, one way of responding to stimuli," and that a consideration, for example, of the "psychological background" is essential, because: "(a) It shows what are the springs, the sources of our action; (b) it makes clear the point that these springs of action determine within what limits our philosophical, scientific, social, and political problems must move; (c) it shows that all knowledge, even philosophy, is for action." Unfortunately it is quite doubtful if the author's summary description of the instincts and other human conations will show the students these extensive principles.

As to the need for the *physical* background Dr. Cunningham finds it illustrated in the fact that the Greek cosmography is "a reflection of their environment" and the Eskimo hell is "cold and dark"—in strong contrast with the Jewish. "Buddhism," he adds, "looks upon heaven as the cessation of all activity, and we little wonder that this is so when we think of the incessant struggle against the steaming heat and humidity of the Himalayan lowlands."

So, likewise, does philosophy "reflect the *social* conditions from which it has arisen and of which it is a part." "In the same way that we speak of eighteenth-century literature, dress, or modes of travel, we may speak of eighteenth-century philosophy." This may be a sound thesis, but the reader will have to take it mostly on authority. It is not really developed argumentatively in the book, nor is it even illustrated on any considerable scale. *Political* and *religious* situations are referred to with more or less success to account for certain philosophical systems—the idealisms of Plato and Berkeley, for example—but the actual bearing, the conditioning relations, of other social or anthropological phenomena on any actual philosophical development is only remotely indicated. Surely it is a far cry to connect Descartes's "thinking substance" with the Orphic religion and his "extended substance" with the Olympian element in Greece. Indeed, could it well be otherwise? Is it feasible to establish such non-obvious relations in a small *introductory* book? Does not the nature of the undertaking require that the reader should be already acquainted with the phenomena—the philosophical conceptions—to be accounted for? The extensive backgrounds sketched as the conditioning environment of philosophy are rather factors which have shaped more or less *all* culture—science, law, art, *etc.*—as well as philosophy; and commonly their influence in this field is much less evident, and probably less potent, than in other directions of human interest. The author virtually admits this when he quotes approvingly the remark of Seth that, "national characteristics are never so strongly marked in science

and philosophy as in other branches of literature, and their influence takes longer in making itself felt," a principle which finds illustration in the connection which the author makes between the empiricism and pragmatism of the English and their insular situation, with its premium upon individual enterprise and experience—perhaps his most successful attempt. The influence of the British national situation is much more evident upon its commerce, industry, and politics, than upon its philosophy.

Professor Cunningham will have us believe that Plato, being embittered by the Democracy's treatment of Socrates, "set about consequently with the definite purpose of showing that *individualism and change are philosophically unsound*." This may account for Plato's course in Athenian politics; but can it be the full story of the motives of that many-sided thinker—a man whose ideas after twenty-four centuries are still potent in politics, ethics, and theology? Moreover, as one reads he wonders how much idea the new student will get of Plato's actual teachings. Of the very few of these that are referred to, the author tells him (quite properly) that the Platonic Ideas are not thoughts—but types—the patterns "after which all particular things are made." The teleological position and function of the Ideas is not mentioned; so that the student, so far as he grasps the teaching at all, is likely to conceive of Platonic idealism as a set of plans regarded as employed by a divine architect, rather than as a posited system of goals toward which all becoming is striving, however imperfectly. Such a conception, of course, leaves the perennial vitality of Platonism an enigma.

One's feeling of inadequacy is heightened when Berkeley's idealism is accounted for entirely on religious grounds—as the attempt of a zealous defender of the faith and opponent of science to overcome materialism by showing that all material objects (so-called) are mental phenomena and therefore the creations of spirit, which is the only substance. That this was a secondary interest of Berkeley's is likely enough; but to find in it his main purpose is to forget that he developed his system when he was a young man, and long before he became a bishop. It is to overlook the fact that theism did not in Berkeley's day cry out for a defender, the dominant philosophies of Descartes and Locke being staunchly theistic; and to overlook, also, a situation especially significant in this connection, namely, that English materialists almost to a man were theists. Even Hobbes argued for the existence of God, and called himself a Christian. And again the question arises whether, in the analysis of Berkeley's motives and methods, the student will feel the force of that thinker's actual contention, and the seriousness, intellectually speaking, of the problem of existences independent of any knowing mind.

When the author comes to Kant and objective idealism even political and religious conditioning agencies begin to yield to purely intellectual ones, religion being but one of the four shaping influences discovered in Kantianism, the others being intellectual, and the political and social situations of the time not being considered at all. (And, by the way, why should Kant, with his agnostic emphases, be chosen as the representative of objective idealism? After his exploits in the field of pure reason can he be thought of as admitting to the status of realities and objects of knowledge ideas described as independent of the individual mind?)

The concluding three chapters of the book are devoted to the influence of the theory of evolution on all departments of thought—of course, a purely intellectual conditioning factor.

It should be added that Professor Cunningham writes in a clear and forcible style; that he gives many evidences of wide reading, often makes apt characterizations, and withal commonly takes view-points which appeal to readers of empirical and pragmatic leanings. As he sees it, for example, one fundamental but double-faced question arose out of the heterogeneity of the Greek population and the changefulness of Greek political affairs. Externally it was the query, "Is there anything *permanent* in the universe? Is there a common principle that runs through all the differences that man perceives?" The new political and social situation following the Persian war, with its new individualistic outlook upon life, turned to light the reverse, or internal, face of the question, namely. "Is there a principle in *man* which is abiding and permanent, and which is common to all men?" "Both questions arose necessarily from the very conditions of Greek life." They are the same "but directed toward a different subject matter"—"one, the problem of the outer world; the other, the problem of the inner world: one, matter or nature; the other, mind or soul." The second of these, with its inescapable *homo mensura* doctrine, becomes the tap-root of the main divisions of modern philosophy. "Is man the measure of truth? This raises the problem of *logic* and *epistemology*, or of knowledge. Is man the measure of *right* and *good*? This, in turn, raises the problem of *politics* and *ethics*. Is man the measure of the *beautiful*? This is the problem of *esthetics*. Thus out of the teachings of the sophists . . . came, in part, the first formulation of the . . . fields within which discussions of a philosophic nature would take place."

Another interesting example of the author's view-points is his account of the animus of the Hellenistic ethical and religious schools. In those stormy days the individual man, finding "the world had got the better of him," sought "to get away from the world of the

object to the world of the subject." He had the belief that the world within was his own, and that he could there find life abundantly." Man, "when the situation gets the better of him," "quits thinking and becomes a poet, romancer, or mystic. Man generally becomes Orphic in his tendencies at the point of loss of control over the facts of his social and political life." Plotinus, for example, represents people who "have lost in the battles of life," and who "fall, like the Oriental and the primitive man, before the powers as a worshiper, rather than an investigator."

It is in his treatment of empiricism and evolutionism that Dr. Cunningham shows the fullest appreciation, and makes the justest comments, no doubt because the pragmatic interest and the interest and the instrumental conception of knowledge are most congenial to him. Like Locke, he "sees in philosophy a method of making a better world. He believes that the idea of creation which we have sketched here [the instrumentalists' idea] gives man a vote in the affairs of the universe, . . . encourages him to attempt things 'unattempted yet in prose or rhyme,' inspires him to the creation of 'more stately mansions,' and to the forsaking of his 'low-vaulted past.' He believes that the days of authority are over . . . and he offers this dynamic universe as a challenge, . . . a universe to be won or lost at man's option, a universe not to fall down before and worship . . . but a universe to be controlled, directed, and recreated by man's intelligence."

One lays this suggestive book down with the feeling that the author might well employ his learning and insight to better advantage than that of searching out the influence of primitive man's initiation ceremonies upon, say, the *Critique of the Practical Reason*!

WILLIAM FORBES COOLEY.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, July, 1919. *The Social Significance of Education* (pp. 345-369): H. W. WRIGHT.—The three conceptions, language, invention and art, conceptions deduced from a study of the content of perception in its early phase as revealed by evolution, furnish appropriate ideas for an interpretation of the educational process. Education should aim at rational communication (language), cooperative industry (invention) and emotional concord (art). *The Logic of Cosmology* (pp. 370-378): BENJAMIN IVES GILMAN.—Expressed on one sentence: "Either there is no such thing as soul, in which case, since gravitation stops when I've gone by, the